Abstract-Based on the CVaR measure, this paper introduces a Cooperation and Competition model for the risk management of the two-stage supply chain. It is supposed that both the supplier and the retailer are risk-averse and their objectives are to minimize their own CVaR(Conditional Value-at-Risk) objective instead of the expected profit. We introduce an e* − optimal equilibrium solution to this model, which implies the supplier and the retailer should give up a same value no more than e* for their cooperation. It is proved that the e*−optimal equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving a corresponding mathematical programming problem. Numerical results show that this method is efficient to improve the risk management of the two-stage supply chain.
INTRODUCTION
With the growing emphasis on globalization, supply chain management has been applied to many fields, such as production plan and financial management [1] [2] . In order to alleviate the bad effects of supply chain disruptions that caused by various unpredictable risks, people introduced many risk control methods to improve the risk management of the supply chain [3] . In 2000, the CVaR measure was introduced to solve the portfolio optimization problems and subsequently proved to be an efficient method for risk management [4] [5] . Thus some researchers introduced the CVaR measure into the supply chain management and some interesting results are achieved [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Chen X. et al. [6] proposed a model based on CVaR measure for the newsvendor model and obtained the optimal order quantity for the retailer with no shortage penalty to maximize his CVaR objective. Xu Minghui et al. [7] extended the model proposed in [6] and obtained the optimal order quantity with shortage penalty for the retailer to maximize his CVaR objective. Gotoh and Takano [8] provided analytical solutions and linear programming formulation of the minimization of CVaR in the newsvendor model. Cheng et al. [9] introduced a bilevel programming model with the CVaR objective for the two-stage supply chain. Hsieh and Yu-Ting [10] characterized the retailer' risk-embedded objective via CVaR measure and studied return policy of the manufacture and the optimal decision of the retailer. Caliskan-Demirag et al. [11] analyzed a suppler's customer and retailer rebates in the context of modeling aversion by adopting CVaR measure. In general, most of the related literature assume that the supplier is risk-neutral and aims to maximize his expected profit or minimize his expected loss. However, many suppliers in the real world are risk-averse and want to reduce the potential risks, while such an issue is always been ignored.
In view of the above issue, this paper assumes that both the supplier and the retailer in the two-stage supply chain are riskaverse, and their objectives are to minimize their own CVaR objective. We propose a Cooperation and Competition model for the two-stage supply chain. In this model, the supplier decides the wholesale price while the retailer decides the order quantity. They compete with each other to minimize their own CVaR objective while they cooperate to get more profits. We introduce an e*-optimal equilibrium solution to this model, which implies the supplier and the retailer should accept the same concession no more than e* for their cooperation. It is proved that the e*-optimal equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving a corresponding mathematical programming problem. Then this model provides an efficient method to coordinate the decisions of the supplier and the retailer in a two-stage supply chain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the notation in this paper and some preliminaries. Section III introduces the proposed model and its solutions. In Section IV, a numerical example is given to illustrate the performance of the proposed model, with conclusions given in Section V.
II. THE NOTATION AND SOME PREPARING RESULTS

A. The Notation
Firstly, we introduce the notation as follows:
x denotes the wholesale price of unit product b denotes the cost of unit product for the supplier a denotes the maximal wholesale price of unit product t denotes the excess penalty coefficient for the supplier y denotes the retailer's order quantity r denotes the salvage price of unit product s denotes the shortage penalty price of unit product n denotes the retailer's minimal order quantity N denotes the retailer's maximal order quantity ξ denotes the stochastic price of the product η denotes the stochastic demand of the product [12] and Mauser et al. [13] pointed out that VaR has some undesirable mathematical characteristics such as nonsubadditivity and non-convexity, which always hinder its efficient usage in practice. Therefore Rockafellar and Uryasev [4] [5] introduced another famous risk measureConditional Value-at-Risk, which is defined as the expected value of loss above the
. CVaR has some attractive properties such as coherence and convexity, which makes it is widely used in risk management. The CVaR with x can be defined as
where ) (⋅ f is the probability density function of ξ and ) (x VaR α is defined by (1). Rockafellar and Uryasev [3] introduced the following auxiliary function 
III. THE PROPOSED MODEL
For the two-stage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, we first give a description on the decision framework of the supplier and the retailer. For the supplier, we assume that he is risk-averse and his objective is to minimize the following
is the loss of the supplier, ) (⋅ φ is the density function of ξ and α is the confidence level. Here, the first term in the right hand of (4) represents the loss of the supplier when he gives a low wholesale price, while the second does the loss when he gives a high wholesale price. 
is the loss of the retailer, ) (⋅ ϕ is the density function of η and β is the confidence level. Here, the first term in the right hand of (5) 
With the result in II.B, the CC model is transformed into
Now, we will introduce an optimal solution to the CC model and show how to obtain this optimal solution. For the problem (PM), let
be the th k − value of the stochastic variable ξ . Then the problem (PM) can be transferred into the following mathematical programming:
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be the th k − value of the stochastic variable η .Then the problem (PR) can be transferred into the following mathematical programming:
be the feasible set to the CC model. We introduce the following definition. 
Definition (1). For any
X v u y x ∈ ) , , , ( , if it satisfies ), , , , ( ) , , , ( * * * * v u y x f v u y x f f f f f ≤ ), , , , ( ) , , , ( * * * * v u y x g v u y x g g g g g ≤ ) , , , ( * * * * f f f f v u} ) , , , ( , ) , , , ( max{ * ' ' ' ' * ' ' ' ' ' g v u y x g f v u y x f e − − = .
Proof.
By the assumption, it follows that
It follows with definition (2) 
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Theorem (1). Suppose that the feasible set X is compact, 
is convergent. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Since f and g are continuous, it follows with By Theorem (3), we can obtain the * e -optimal equilibrium solution of the supplier and the retailer by solving the corresponding problem (PE). In reality, the supplier and the retailer may be want to give different concession values for their cooperation. For such a case, we have the following definitions.
Definition (4). Let 
Then we have the following result. Table I . By Table I , it is easily found that when the supplier's excess penalty coefficient t increases, the supplier's wholesale price x will decrease, and the optimal equilibrium value * e will decrease, too. If t increases, the supplier's loss will increase when he gives a high wholesale price. Then the supplier should
Theorem (4)
.
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better give a smaller wholesale price to ensure the future cooperation with the retailer. Table II. Table III.   TABLE III. RESULTS OF THE EXAMPLE WITH R = 0.5, S = 1 AND Α = Β = 0.80 ) , ( increases, which implies the supplier gives more concessions in the cooperation, the supplier's wholesale price will decrease. For such a case, the retailer's order quantity will increase and the optimal equilibrium value * e will increase, too.
To summarize this section, we can conclude that the proposed method is efficient to enhance the cooperation between the supplier and the retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer will do their best to cooperate with each other. The 
